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WHERE IS THE FREEDOM IN
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT? A
COMMENT ON TREBILCOCK'S THE
LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRA CT
By HAMISH STEWART*
Michael Trebilcock's recent exploration of the limits of
freedom of contract systematically considers both the
instrumental and the intrinsic value of freedom or
autonomy in an economic analysis. A third way of
thinking about the value of freedom of contract is to
take it as a presupposition of contract law: that is,
freedom of contract is not just instrumentally or
intrinsically desirable, but is conceptually necessary to
contract law. Two examples are presented to suggest
that by not considering this third perspective,
Trebilcock leaves himself without a structure in which
to deal with some of the issues that trouble him.
L'exploration r6cente de Michael Trebilcock, quant
aux limites de Ia libert6 de contrat, consid6re de fagon
syst6matique Ia valeur instrumentale ainsi
qu'intrinsaque de la libert6 ou de l'autonomie dan une
analyse 6conomique. Une troisi~me fagon de penser A
la valeur de la libert6 de contrat est de consid6rer cela
comme une pr6supposition du droit des contrats.
C'est- -dire, la libert6 de contrat n'est pas seulement
souhaitable, du point de vue instrumentale ou
intrins~que, mais elle est conceptuellement n6cessaire
au droit des contrats. Les deux exemples pr6sent~s
sugg~rent que l'absence de cette troisi~me perspective
dans le travail de Trebilcock resulte dans un manque de
structure dont il serait possible d'aborder certaines des
questions qui preoccupent l'auteur.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 260
II. COMMODIFICATION ....................................................... 261
III. COERCION ................................................................. 265
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................. 271
© 1996, H. Stewart.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I have had the advantage of
access- to a draft of Michael Trebilcock's "Rejoinder" while revising this comment. I also thank
Ernie Weinrib, Alan Brudner, Peter Benson, Richard Craswell, Robert Howse, and other
participants in the 24th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law (Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto, October 1994) for their difficult and helpful questions, not all of which are
answered here.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
There are at least three ways to think about the importance of
freedom of contract. First, freedom of contract might promote general
welfare, economic efficiency, or some other goal. This instrumental
approach to valuing freedom of contract is characteristic of economic
analysis of law.1 Second, freedom of contract might be valuable in its
own right; apart from its instrumental value, freedom of choice might be
a good thing in itself. Perhaps people are happier when they are able to
choose for themselves, or perhaps having more choices is a good thing,
quite apart from its effect on efficiency or welfare 2 Third, freedom of
choice might be presupposed in the doctrines of contract law, in that
those doctrines treat the contracting parties as autonomous agents who
are free and equal in the sense that they have an abstract capacity to
enter into contracts. On this view, whether or not freedom of contract is
instrumentally or intrinsically valuable, it is an inescapable aspect of
contract law.3
Michael Trebilcock's recent exploration of the limits of freedom
of contract systematically considers the first two of these perspectives.
In this regard, Trebilcock's work represents an advance on traditional
economic analysis of law, which all too often has contented itself with a
merely instrumental analysis of freedom, without considering the value
that freedom might have in its own right.4 Trebilcock is concerned with
the "convergence thesis" that private ordering-by which he means
roughly the use of the market to determine the production, allocation,
and distribution of most goods-"simultaneously promotes individual
freedom (autonomy) and social welfare," 5 and with the role of freedom
of contract-meaning both allowing individuals to make their own
decisions about what agreements to enter into and enforcing strictly
1 M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1993) at 15-17.
2 Ib at 22; A.K. Sen, "Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content" (1988) 32 European Econ.
Rev. 269 at 270-72 [hereinafter "Freedom of Choice"].
3 EJ. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) at
13640; P. Benson, "Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract:
Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory" (1989) 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077.
4 See, for example, R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,
1992) c. 4. I am not suggesting that Posner does not assign any intrinsic value to freedom, but that
this value plays no role in his analysis of freedom of contract. Sen, in "Freedom of Choice" supra
note 2, notes other areas of economic analysis in which the intrinsic value of freedom tends to be
neglected.
5 Trebilcock, supra note I at 241.
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those agreements-in private ordering. While Trebilcock does not find
the convergence thesis particularly compelling, it is clear that he regards
freedom of contract as both a vital instrument in the pursuit of welfare
and a crucial guarantor against the usurpation of individual autonomy by
governments or tyrannical majorities.
In this comment, I want to suggest that despite Trebilcock's
welcome consideration of the intrinsic value of autonomy, his exclusion
of the third perspective on freedom of contract leads him astray. By not
considering the extent to which freedom of choice is presupposed by
contract law, he leaves himself without a structure in which to deal with
some of the issues that trouble him. Trebilcock himself notes that "in
justifying the general claim ... that more individual freedom of choice is
better than less, it is difficult to avoid ultimately being driven to a
consequentialist rationale, probably with utilitarian (or welfare)
connotations." 6 The intrinsic value that he places on autonomy requires
him to resist this slide from autonomist values to welfarist ones, but
without a structure that takes the autonomy of contracting parties not
just as a good in itself but as a necessary conceptual feature of contract
law, he is unable to resist this collapse. To support my suggestion, I
consider two examples from Trebilcock's book and show not only that
his welfarist analysis drives his approach to autonomy values both times,
but also that a consideration of the conceptual necessity for freedom of
contract might prevent this subordination.
II. COMMODIFICATION
Trebilcock begins his substantive analysis with a problem that is
rarely even acknowledged in economic analysis: whether "certain human
attributes or resources should lie wholly or partly beyond the exchange
process, because to allow full commodification would be inconsistent
with theories of personhood or human flourishing."'7 But something odd
happens between his asking the question and his answering it: after
considering commodification "in five difficult and controversial
contexts,"8 Trebilcock concludes that just about everything should be
commodified. How does this conclusion come about? I suggest that it is
Trebilcock's neglect of the role of autonomy as a fundamental
6Ibid. at 247 [footnote omitted].
7 Ibid. at 23.
8 Ibid. at 56.
1995]
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presupposition of contract law .that leads him to this conclusion.
I will take just one of Trebilcock's five examples and show how
his disregard for the underlying structure of contract law causes him to
miss important questions. Consider surrogacy contracts, in which "a
married couple ... arrange for a fertile female to be impregnated
artificially with the sperm of the would-be father, to carry the foetus to
term, and to relinquish it ... for adoption"9 in exchange for financial
compensation (usually, the couple cannot have its own children). The
advantages of surrogacy contracts, from a purely economic point of view,
are the same as the advantages of any other contract: we presume that
voluntary exchanges benefit both parties to the exchange, and therefore,
in the absence of externalities, raise aggregate welfare. But surrogacy
contracts are open to a number of familiar objections, two of which have
particular bearing on the issue of commodification. First, some people
argue "that payment for the birth mother's role in the arrangement
commodifies and debases an intrinsic element of her personhood, in this
case, her reproductive faculties.... [S]urrogate motherhood embraces an
offensive form of utilitarianism insofar as it involves the use of one
person as a means to the ends of others."10 Second, surrogacy, by
commodifying the child as well as the mother's labour, "may result in
adverse consequences for the welfare of the child, who may not see
himself or be perceived by his parents as intrinsically valuable.",,
In response to these objections, Trebilcock uses both economic
and feminist arguments, but his arguments are all consequentialist. With
respect to the first objection, Trebilcock notes that all contractual
exchanges involve the use of one person by another: "This is simply
another way of saying that both parties benefit from an exchange. '12 He
also points to potential beneficial consequences of surrogacy in
"transform[ing] the confining stereotype of 'womanhood as
motherhood"' and reinforcing women's "full dominion and autonomy
over their bodies. '13 With respect to the second objection, Trebilcock
notes that raising a child, whatever its genetic origins, costs a lot of
money; he argues that this expenditure "does not seem to have
9ibid. at 48.
10Ibid. at 50 [footnotes omitted]. Trebilcock attributes this objection to a number of writers,
including M.J. Radin, "Market Inalienability" (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 at 1929-30; E.
Anderson, "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" (1990) 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 71 at 80-87.
11 Trebilcock, ibid. at 52; see Anderson, ibid. at 75-80.
12 Trebilcock, ibid. at 50.
131bid. at 51.
[VOL. 33 NO. 2
Where Is the Freedom in Freedom of Contract?
destroyed the love most parents feel for their children, and it is difficult
to believe that allowing commercial surrogacy contracts is antithetical to
this love."'14 Thus, Trebilcock concludes that surrogacy contracts should
not be considered contrary to public policy; while he proposes a legal
regime that would formalize the surrogate mother's right to repudiate
the contract and keep the baby, he remains generally optimistic that
permitting surrogacy contracts would have beneficial consequences.
15
But if Trebilcock is correct in his responses to the
commodification objections, it is hard to see on what grounds he would
object to straightforward baby-selling: if people generally benefit from
voluntary exchanges, and if surrogacy does not devalue children, then
why would a full-fledged market for adoptions not also be a wise policy?
One might ask further why a person cannot sell himself or herself into
slavery, and Trebilcock cannot quite bring himself to object to such
contracts. In a curious passage, commenting on John Stuart Mill, he
assimilates the arguments against voluntary enslavement to those for the
prohibition of narcotics:
[Mill] regarded such contracts as inconsistent with basic notions of individual self-
fulfillment or perhaps human flourishing. But then ... how would he be able to avoid the
slippery slope argument that all kinds of other conduct, such as the use of narcotic drugs,
cigarettes, and alcohol, are also often highly self-destructive and likely to reduce
dramatically the scope of one's future liberties? It might be rejoined that slavery
contracts are such an extreme case of future liberty-restricting conduct that in most
instances ... one should infer either coercion, ignorance of relevant facts, or cognitive
deficiencies, and that this presumption is so strong that it is not worth investigating each
case to determine whether it might fall outside the presumption.... [T]he difficulty with
this position is that at base it entails a form of moral majoritarianism where activities are
condemned as "free-floating evils," irrespective of any demonstration of harm to third
parties from them. The limits on this kind of collective intervention in the domain of
individual choices are far from self-evident.
1 6
While I am sure Trebilcock would endorse neither baby-selling nor
contracts of enslavement, he appears unpersuaded by his own
instrumental arguments, based on externalities or paternalism, against
them. But other arguments are both available and necessary.
If the law of contract is concerned with the interaction of free
and autonomous agents in making voluntary exchanges, then there must
be something that cannot be subject to contract, namely, the agent's
capacity to contract, or autonomy itself. It would be contradictory to
suppose that the very feature of an agent that made contractual
14Ibid. at 52.
15 Ibid. at 53-56.
16 Ibid. at 162 [footnotes omitted].
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exchange possible could itself be permanently exchanged; the agent
would in effect simultaneously deny and assert his or her capacity to
contract. This is essentially Hegel's argument that selling oneself into
slavery would be contradictory;17 the argument is best appreciated in the
contrast Hegel draws between wage labour and slavery:
I can give ... [someone else] the use of my abilities for a restricted period, because, on the
strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire an external relation to the totality and
universality of my being. By alienating the whole of my time, as crystallized in my work,
and everything I produced, I would be making into another's property the substance of
my being, my universal activity and actuality, my personality. 18
Whether Hegel was right to leave wage labour in the category of things
that can be alienated is a question that I will not address here, 19 but he
was clearly right to assert that some aspects of human labour are
inalienable; otherwise, there would in principle be no human agency left
to alienate things, or indeed to possess them.
Thus the objection that surrogacy "commodifies and debases an
intrinsic element of ... personhood"20 cannot be dismissed as easily as
Trebilcock supposes, because it rests not only on the consequentialist
arguments that he identifies, but also on the argument that reproductive
capacity is so closely tied to a person's agency that it cannot be alienable.
Similarly, the objection that surrogacy is merely a form of baby-selling
rests not just on consequentialist arguments but also on the idea that
there is something contradictory about selling human beings: if I cannot
alienate my own agency through the market, it would seem implausible
that I could alienate a baby through the market (even if that alienation
17 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press,
1952) at 66 (Remark). See also J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on
Representative Government, 'ed. by H.B. Acton (London: Everyman, 1972) at 157-58. As we have
seen, Trebilcock, ibid. at 161-62, interprets this passage in consequentialist terms, but I suggest that
a conceptual reading is also possible.
18 Hegel, ibid. at 167. The Addition to this paragraph makes it clear that Hegel intended to
contrast wage labour and slavery. See also I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 139.
19 Radin, supra note 10 at 1894, suggests that this argument of Hegel's is purely conclusory,
and Trebilcock, supra note 1 at 24 appears to agree with her. In contrast, Anderson's argument,
supra note 10, that women's reproductive labour should not be commodified seems ultimately to
suggest that labour geherally should not be commodified. This argument goes back at least to Marx,
for whom wage labour had something of the same contradictory character that Hegel attributed to
slavery. Marx argued that wage labour involved the worker in a systematic means/ends reversal
where labour, which ought to be an essential aspect of life, becomes a mere instrument for survival:
"Life itself appears only as a means to life": K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
trans. M. Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964) at 113.
20 Trebilcock, ibid. at 50.
264
Where Is the Freedom in Freedom of Contract?
does not involve selling the baby into slavery)?' These arguments will
not necessarily be decisive against surrogacy contracts, but it seems to
me that arguments of this sort are the only ones that can arrest
Trebilcock's slide to the position that questions of
commodification-selling oneself into slavery, baby-selling, surrogacy,
prostitution, wage labour-can be determined with arguments that are
exclusively empirical and consequentialist. Contract law depends on the
assumption that the parties are free and autonomous agents, and there
are some contracts that such agents cannot make without denying their
own freedom and autonomy.
22
III. COERCION
Most accounts of coercion in the philosophical literature proceed
by attempting to match a series of fairly standard examples with the
author's intuitions. 23 In each example, one person, a, is attempting to
get another, f3, to do or to promise something. To this end, a makes a
proposal tofl that changesfi's opportunities in some way. Consider the
following familiar examples:
A. The Armed Robber. "An armed robber threatens his victim on a
dark and lonely street: 'Your money or your life.' 24 The victim
hands over his money.
B. The Altruistic Robber. The armed robber wants his victim's
watch, which the victim and the market value at $500. The
robber is aware of these valuations, and yet has an idiosyncratic
desire for this particular watch. He points his gun at his victim,
and says "Your watch for $1000, or your life" (i.e., "Sell me your
21 In his "Rejoinder," (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall LIJ. 355 at 367, Trebilcock suggests that my
argument here entails a pro-life position in the abortion debate. This conclusion would follow only
if (1) the fetus were an autonomous person, and (2) the fetus's rights and interests would always
trump the mother's. I hold neither of these positions. No compelling arguments have been
advanced for recognizing the fetus as an autonomous person; but even if the fetus were accorded
this status, its rights could not be spelled out without careful attention to the autonomy of the
mother. See M. Shaffer, "Foetal Rights and the Regulation of Abortion" (1994) 39 McGill LJ. 58.
22 For an example from the case law, see Horvood v. Millar's Timber and Trading Co., Ltd.,
[1917] 1 K.B. 305. The English Court of Appeal refused to enforce a contract which, though not
amounting to enslavement, excessively restrained one party's freedom of action.
23 This section draws heavily on a larger work in progress, begun under Professor Trebilcock's
supervision: H. Stewart,A FormalApproach to Contractual Coercion (Toronto, 1995) [unpublished].
24 C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1981) at 95; compare Trebilcock, supra note I at 84-85.
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watch for $1,000"). The victim agrees to sell the watch.25
C. The Foundering Ship. A tugboat, x, happens upon a ship, J3, in
distress. In return for a promised fee greatly in excess of the
normal charge, the tug tows the ship to safety.2 6
D. The Lecherous Millionaire. c, the Lecherous Millionaire, "will
pay for the expensive surgery that alone can save her [/'s] child's
life provided that she becomes for a period his mistress."27
E. The Penny Black. "One stamp collector offers another a 'Penny
Black' at a steep price, knowing that the buyer needs just this
stamp to complete a set."28 The buyer, f3, agrees to the seller's,
a's, price.
F. The Competitive Grocer. One of several competitive grocers, a,
in an affluent suburb offers peas for sale at a competitive price.
A Shopper, fl, buys some peas from the Grocer.29
G. The Starving Peasant. One of several competitive rice merchants,
ax, in the Bengal famine of 1943 offers rice for sale at five times
the pre-famine price. Outside his store, people starve to death;
however, one Starving Peasant, f3, convinces the Merchant to sell
him some rice on credit0 °
Everyone agrees that A involves coercion and that F does not; it
is the other cases that present problems. Most accounts say that f3 is
coerced by a's proposal if the proposal makes J3's opportunities worse as
compared with some "baseline" set of opportunities that f would, or
should, have faced in the absence of a's proposal. The accounts differ
principally as to what the appropriate baseline is. Fried and
25 Compare R. Nozick, "Coercion" in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, & M. White, eds.,
Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (New York: St. Martin's, 1969) 440
at 440: "If you go to the movies I'll give you $10,000. If you don't go, I'll kill you." Compare J.
Feinberg, Harm to Self(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 217.
26 Compare Trebilcock, supra note 1 at 85-86; Fried, supra note 24 at 109 (rescuers unloading
cargo at a fraction of its value); Nozick, supra note 25 at 449 (drowning man); Feinberg, supra note
25 at 220-25 (drowning man); and A. Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987) at 207 (drowning man).
2 7 Feinberg, supra note 25 at 229; compare Trebilcock, supra note 1 at 90-91; and Wertheimer,
supra note 26 at 229-33.
28 Fried, supra note 24 at 95; compare Trebilcock, ibid. at 87-90.
29 Compare Fried, ibid.
30 Compare Trebilcock, supra note 1 at 97-101 ("non-monopolized necessity"). For the
Bengal famine, see A.K. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) c. 6 (the increase in prices can be seen in Table 6.6 at 69); for starvation
outside shops during that famine, see A.K. Sen, Resources, Values and Development (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) at 458.
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Wertheimer,31 among others, propose theories in which the baseline is
moralized; that is, a's proposal is not deemed to worsen fl's position
unless the proposal is wrongful in some moral sense. Nozick and
Feinberg,32 among others, propose theories in which fl's baseline is
determined empirically or phenomenally; the question is then not
whether a had a right to make his or whether the proposal wrongedfl in
some way, but whether that proposal worsened fl's opportunities relative
to what would have happened if a andfl had never met.
Trebilcock criticizes moralized theories of coercion on the
following ground: "while it is possible to determine whether A's proposal
is coercive once B's moral base-line has been set, once B's moral base-
line has been set all the interesting theoretical work will already have
been done."33 He therefore seeks a sort of empirical baseline, beginning
by situating the question of freedom of contract within the paradigm of
rational choice: "[t]he question is whether the constrained choices facing
one of the contracting parties renders her consent to the express
contract in question involuntary so as to vitiate that consent."
34
Trebilcock attacks the problem with three distinctions: exploitation
versus creation of risk, life-threatening versus non-life-threatening risk,
and monopoly versus non-monopoly. The Armed Robber, for example,
both creates and exploits life-threatening risks, while the offeror of the
Penny Black exploits, but does not create, non-life-threatening risk. The
Starving Peasant finds himself in a non-monopolized but life-threatening
situation. The other examples can be similarly classified. But for
Trebilcock, these three distinctions are ultimately understood in terms of
a fourth, situational versus structural monopoly:
In a situational monopoly ... it is the relatively fortuitous circumstances surrounding the
interaction between the particular parties to the exchange which create the monopoly
power that A opportunistically exploits in return for a quid pro quo that has no or
negative social value ... or in respect of which B is induced to pay vastly more than the
competitive or normal value of the services.
Generally in the case of structural monopolies ... the market power is non-transitory,
obtains against all parties in the relevant market, and is exogenous to and precedes the
particular circumstances of the interaction between parties to a given exchange.
35
Trebilcock concludes that "[t]he principal focus of a theory of coercion
31 Fried, supra note 24; Wertheimer, supra note 26.
32 Nozick, supra note 25; Feinberg, supra note 25.
33 Trebilcock, supra note 1 at 80.
3 4 Ib at 78.
35 ]bid at 93 and 95.
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in the common law of contracts in two-party disputes should be
situational monopolies that arise out of the particular circumstances
surrounding specific exchanges, '3 6 and would apparently grant relief
only in a situational monopoly and only if the situational monopolist
extracted much more than the competitive value of the good or service.
This approach is appealing because it captures many of our
intuitions about which contracts should be enforced while making room
for some of the insights of the economic analysis of law. It plausibly
solves the-question of why the contracts in cases A (the Armed Robber)
and C (the Foundering Ship) should not be enforced, while those in E
(the Penny Black) and F (the competitive grocer) should. But the
distinction between situational and structural monopolies does not seem
to capture what really constrains the parties in some of the other cases.
For instance, Trebilcock would have to enforce the rice merchant's
contract with the Starving Peasant, who faces neither a monopoly nor a
non-competitive price. Further, Trebilcock's suggestion of remitting the
problem of structural monopolies to public law (anti-trust) does not
assist the Starving Peasant; what seems problematic about his situation is
certainly that his range of choice has been restricted, but it is precisely
through the operation of private ordering that this restriction has come
about. Assuming that the Starving Peasant's situation is properly
described as one of unfreedom, and that we should do something about
it, Trebilcock's approach does not seem helpful0 7
On the other side of the coin, Trebilcock would apparently have
to enforce the Altruistic Robber's contract; while the robber is a
situational monopolist, the "quid pro quo" extracted is more than
reasonable in market terms, and therefore the victim's situation does not
meet Trebilcock's second requirement for relief. Yet, what seems to be
morally relevant about this interaction is not the price or some other
economic variable, but the Robber's threat to use force against the
victim.38
361bid. at 101.
37 I should add that I agree with Trebilcock's conclusion regarding non-monopolized
necessity, that contract law is not always an appropriate "vehicle for achieving our distributive
justice goals relative to the tax and transfer system": ibid. My concern is that Trebilcock's
framework, by focussing on competitive market outcomes as the ultimate measure of freedom,
appears to miss the real unfreedom in the Starving Peasant's situation, treating it as a welfare
problem only. See "Freedom of Choice" supra note 2 at 276-79; A.K. Sen, Inequality Reexamined
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) c. 2 and c. 4.
38 In his Rejoinder, Trebilcock describes the Altruistic Robber as "quaint and other-worldly,"
but see Stot v.Merit Investment Corp. (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 288 (C.A.), rev'g (1985), 33 A.C.W.S.
(2d) 403 (Ont. H.C.J.). Stott was a salesman for Merit in 1979-80, a time of large fluctuations in the
[VOL. 33 No. 2
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Second, Trebilcock's attempt to avoid as far as possible a
moralized baseline fails. Recall that Trebilcock's objections to theories
that moralize the baseline is that they out all the interesting work outside
the law of contract. But there are two ways in which Trebilcock, too,
pushes much of the "interesting theoretical work" outside his own
framework. He recognizes the first; speaking of the Lecherous
Millionaire and related cases involving sexual proposals, he says:
[I]t seems to me to be difficult to avoid a moral base-line (rights-theory) approach if we
are to give effect to the moral intuition that most of us are likely to feel about these cases.
[This] ... appears to implicate issues similar to those canvassed in Chapter 2
["Commodification"], where to enforce transactions in these circumstances is likely to
violate basic notions of human dignity and self-respect.
3 9
Trebilcock is quite right to raise the question of commodification, but to
refuse to enforce the contract on these grounds points away from
questions of coercion, consent, and voluntariness. If sexuality is not to
be a commodity, then it really doesn't matter how eagerly or reluctantly
the desperate mother enters into the agreement with the Lecherous
Millionaire; coercion is beside the point.
Trebilcock shares with other economists his reluctance to
recognize the second way in which his theory is moralized. Recall that
Trebilcock's theory has two branches. First, there must be a situational
monopoly; second, the consideration flowing from f3 to a must be
unjustified by "the normal competitive environment." 40 a's proposal to
f3 is, then, being assessed from a competitive baseline; even in, a
situational monopoly, where J3 has "no choice," Trebilcock's theory
would not give J3 relief if the consideration extracted by a is no greater
than the competitive value of a's service. The competitive baseline can,
at least in principle, be derived empirically; but to use it as a reference
point for assessing coercion is to endow it with normative significance.
The competitive market price functions in Trebilcock's account not just
as a measure of the substantive fairness of the bargain, but as a
price of gold. One of Stott's customers lost a substantial sum and apparently could not pay.
According to industry practice, Stott was expected to cover the loss. Stott signed an
acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Merit, under circumstances which the Court of Appeal held
amounted to duress. Merit threatened to dismiss Stott if he did not sign the agreement, but
promised him that "if he did sign, the company would hold him in high esteem and would open a
trading account for him and in effect, that he would never, in the result, be called on to pay a cent."
This proposal, though not amounting to an independent crime or tort as in the Altruistic Robber,
has the same structure: Stott would receive a benefit if he complied and would be subject to
wrongful action if he did not comply. (The Court of Appeal went on to hold that though the
agreement was voidable, Stott had affirmed it by his subsequent conduct.)
3 9 Trebilcock, supra note I at 91.
4 0 Ibid- at 101.
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determinant of the voluntariness of the transaction. Because Trebilcock
makes the competitive outcome the reference point, his theory must
ultimately require values of freedom and autonomy to yield to welfarist
values.
I have argued elsewhere that the best account of coercion for the
purposes of contract law is one which holds that fl's act or promise was
obtained by coercion only if o's proposal contained a threat to do a legal
wrong to 13.41 The "legal baseline" approach has the advantage of
recognizing and protecting the intrinsic value of freedom in a sphere
which is particularly suited to it, while at the same time leaving open
other grounds for refusing to enforce contracts. But the legal baseline
approach also has a coherence that seems to be lacking in economic
approaches. Trebilcock's theory of coercion requires enforcement of the
Altruistic Robber's contract. But this enforcement seems to put the law
in the contradictory position of simultaneously affirming and denying the
rightfulness of the Robber's conduct. On the one hand, by refusing the
recognize the victim's plea of coercion and by enforcing the Robber's
claim to enforcement of the contract, the law says that the Robber's
claim was rightful; on the other hand, the law is certainly going to regard
the Robber's conduct as both criminal and tortious, and as such
wrongful. At a minimum, it seems to me that a theory of coercion in
contract must deny enforcement of agreements obtained through the
doing of a legal wrong; the weakness in economic approaches,
Trebilcock's among them, is that they draw attention away from the
contracting parties as agents and toward the consequences for society at
large of enforcement 42 However important these consequences may be,
they seem to have little bearing on the voluntariness of the particular
transaction.
41 Stewart, supra note 23.
42 This weakness can be seen in a case that Trebilcock offers to cast doubt on my minimal
requirement of a legal wrong. Consider the case of a slave "who holds up his owner at gunpoint one
night and demands his freedom." Trebilcock suggests that despite the wrongfulness of the slave's
threat, "we might well wish to enforce this agreement," because slavery is itself unjust: supra note 1
at 85. This example seems to me to shed little light on the problem of coercion in the law of
contract. On the one hand, it is inconceivable that a court in a jurisdiction that recognized slavery
would uphold the agreement; on the other hand, the slave's action would not be wrongful in a
jurisdiction where slavery itself was illegal. In other words, the reasons that "we" would offer for or
against upholding the agreement have nothing to do with the nature of the interaction between the
master and the slave, but everything to do with "our" view of slavery. For some of the legal
perplexities created by the institution of slavery, see M. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery,
1810-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It may well be that private ordering, with freedom of contract as
one of its main elements, is a valuable instrument in the pursuit of both
welfare and autonomy. But goods that are instrumentally valuable must
be valuable for someone; there must be, underlying the law of contract, a
purposive, autonomous agent who is more than just a site for utility or
even for a range of choices. The weakness of Trebilcock's account of
commodification is that it assumes what has to be proven: that it is
appropriate to commodify everything. The only arguments against
commodification that Trebilcock considers are purely instrumental ones,
but the question of commodification must be considered, at least in part,
from the perspective of an agent who is not merely instrumental to other
agents and who has a capacity to behave non-instrumentally. Similarly,
Trebilcock's account of coercion, though it beings with a focus on the
range of choice facing the agent, ends with a welfarist baseline that
draws attention away from the autonomy of the choosing agent.
Trebilcock is right to want to make room for autonomy as well as welfare
in his framework, but to really make that room, he must take autonomy
even more seriously than he does.
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